

Learning starts when actual consequences of an action strategy do not correspond with expected consequences. Besides these elements, theories of action contain governing variables, norms, and values that make consequence C desirable or worthwhile to achieve. The assumptions constitute a model of the world, in which it is likely that action strategy A will lead to consequence C in situation S. Argyris and Schön express this relationship in the cognitive concept of theory of action, which has the general form: “in situation S, if you want to achieve consequence C, under assumptions a 1… a n, do A” (Argyris and Schön 1974, p. 6). Human action should lead to more effective knowledge, which in its turn should lead to more effective action. Central to such learning, according to Argyris and Schön, is the cyclical relationship between knowledge and action. The first aspect is organizational learning, in which agents learn for the organization, the results of which are stored in organizational memory. On the basis of Őrtenblad ( 2002, 2004) and Argyris and Schön ( 1974, 1978, 1996) four aspects may be distinguished that must be present for an organization to be appropriately labeled a learning organization. The army case involved is the Polish campaign and its aftermath (1939–1940), which case more than later German operations shows the significance of learning from past events for future performance. More in general, Argyris and Schön were the first to depart from a purely descriptive, academic-oriented approach to analyzing organizational learning and to adopt a more prescriptive, practice-oriented approach to developing learning organizations (Easterby-Smith and Lyles 2003 Easterby-Smith et al. Recognizing the ambiguity of the concept of learning organization in the work of early proponents like Senge ( 1990), and on the basis of an extended literature review and synthesis, Őrtenblad ( 2002, 2004, 2007) distinguishes four aspects, discussed in detail below, which must be present for an organization to be properly called “learning.” The framework of Argyris and Schön ( 1974, 1978, 1996) complements this model by explicitly furthering insight into two of these aspects and implicitly supporting two others. In this paper I analyze a particular case of German Army operations on the basis of Őrtenblad’s integrated model of the learning organization and the theoretical framework of Argyris and Schön.
